JUDICIAL CORRUPTION

We have divided power between three branches of government and erected checks and balances to prevent abuse of power.  However, where is the check on the power of the judiciary?  If we fail to check the power of the judiciary, I predict that we will eventually live under judicial tyranny.      

Patrick Henry

Prior to my first day in court, I naively believed that judges were honorable and that truth and justice would prevail.  Instead, what I discovered is that our courts are a taxpayer-funded system of organized crime that is accountable to no one.

The Catholic priest scandal has nothing on the betrayals of public trust and cover-ups that are occurring in these secretive kangaroo courts, where the law is whatever these judges want to arbitrarily say it is behind closed courtroom doors to generate as much billable litigation, federal funding, and court filing fees as possible.

If there are honorable judges in this state and country with the moral fortitude to hold their colleagues accountable, then it is the exception and not the rule because I have yet to find one in a test group that includes four family court judges, four superior court judges, three judges of the Massachusetts appeals court, the seven judges of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, one "Massachusetts-based" U.S. district court judge, and three "Massachusetts-based" judges of the First Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals.

There is nothing more frightening than to know that no matter how strong my case, no matter how many facts I can produce to support my case, and no matter how many laws must be defied to rule against me; the judges in Massachusetts will do just that to deny me justice as a "critic" of this state's corrupt court system.

The retaliation against me has followed such a consistent script that it would not surprise me to discover that the judges in my cases were receiving the following directives from above or from their colleagues:

(1)defy the law to dismiss my cases before they can succeed on their merits

before a jury.

(2)and in the meantime, do everything possible to prolong my cases and add

to their costs.

It is the Sixth Amendment that preserves the right to a trial by a jury of one's peers in criminal cases and it is the Seventh Amendment that preserves that same right in civil cases.  These Amendments were enacted to eliminate the "tyranny" of giving a single judge the power to decide a person's fate. 

That "tyranny" is alive and well in our state and federal courts, where judges have sidestepped this limitation on their power by dismissing cases before they can be heard by someone outside their corrupt little circle.

Why have I been targeted?

Because I wrote a book on the topic of judicial corruption, which gained national media attention when it was "banned' by a judge criticized in that book;

because I filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court against several state court judges, which should have every one of them facing jail time and removal from the bench;

and because I have reported every judge who has betrayed the public's trust by defying their own code of conduct and the laws of the land that they have sworn to uphold to the Commission on Judicial Conduct.

My efforts to hold these judges accountable has resulted in witness-verifiable gossip about me behind closed courtroom doors and lawyers admitting to me in no uncertain terms that they would not represent me in court for fear that they would be retaliated against themselves.

The dismissal of a case is supposed to be "a drastic remedy that is employed only sparingly." See Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveway Co., 173 F.3d at 918 (4th Cir. 1999).  And since I am a pro se litigant, there is also supposed to be a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss.

A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint must read the complaint's allegations expansively and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2D 263 (1972).

"The court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.  If there is any possible theory that would entitle the Plaintiff to relief, even one that the Plaintiff has not thought of, the court cannot dismiss the case." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975).

Pro se litigant or not, for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court is to take all facts alleged by the plaintiff as true.  Steckman v. Hart Brewing Company, Inc., 143 F.3d, 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998).

With that being said, I have yet to survive a motion to dismiss in Essex Superior Court and U.S. District Court for reasons that have had nothing at all to do with the merits of these cases OR my competence at representing myself in court.

Taken separately, the crimes committed against me could be credited to judicial incompetence, but taken cumulatively and it can hardly be disputed that there is more than enough circumstantial evidence to conclude that there has been a conspired effort among several state and federal court judges to deny me justice.

 

Since the dismissals of my cases were each followed by denials of my motions for reconsideration, which detailed the reasons why each of these cases could not be dismissed, a reference to these documents will confirm that the judges involved in my cases are guilty of knowingly defying the law to obstruct justice.

The corruption that I have endured originated in family court, which already denies to litigants their constitutional right to a trial by a jury of one's peers. 

That corruption has extended to Essex Superior Court and U.S. District Court, which have been dismissing my cases before they could succeed on their merits before a jury. 

If the corruption were isolated to these courts, then it would not continue for long before a higher court intervenes on appeal to act as a deterrent. 

Unfortunately, the criminally-negligent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct have proven that there is no one holding judges accountable unless forced to do so when judicial crimes and misconduct have leaked to the public.

The only feelings that I have for this country's court system are those of disgust. The fix is clearly in.  If a litigant waits to file a judicial misconduct complaint until after the ruling on the case, the complaint is thrown out as a case of a disgruntled litigant who was not happy with the decision.  If a litigant files a complaint while the case is still active, the subject judge abuses his power to retaliate against the litigant who reported him.

In the Massachusetts state courts, judges are allegedly held accountable by the higher courts and the Commission on Judicial Conduct ("CJC"), which calls itself an "independent agency of the Judicial Branch" in defiance of the fact that it consists of judges and lawyers who still work as judges and lawyers in the state's court system.

If the higher courts OR this agency served such a purpose and held judges accountable to some type of standard of acceptable behavior, then judges would start adhering to the law and the rights of litigants who come before them. 

Instead, what I have found is that the "higher court" judges have creatively interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to give themselves immunity and the absolute power to commit whatever crimes they want against litigants; while the Commission on Judicial Conduct exists to conceal judicial misconduct. 

The only time that the criminally-negligent CJC responds to complaints with disciplinary action is when forced to respond to judicial crimes that have been made public, which is why there have been only two public hearings on judicial misconduct since 2002 - those involved the high profile, media-reported cases of Judge Maria I. Lopez and Judge Ernest B. Murphy.

Interestingly enough, the misconduct of which these two were accused, pales in comparison to the crimes committed by judges every day behind closed courtroom doors that the mainstream media has failed to report on.

It is a FACT with a reference to my case alone that the Commission on Judicial Conduct AND the higher courts are excusing crimes and misconduct that should have many of these judges removed from the bench and behind bars.

Since there are too many negatives and very few positives for a litigant to even consider a complaint against a judge, who is made aware of the complaint when it is filed and who has the power to then retaliate against the litigant who reported him, it is likely that there are many more complaints that should be filed, but are not. 

Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of complaints that are filed in the face of such deterrents are legitimate and can be substantiated with the evidence.

With that being said, of the 1,304 new complaints that have been docketed over the last five years, the Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct has responded to only 39 of these complaints with some type of disciplinary action (less than 3%) and 25 of these 39 cases (64.1%) resulted in nothing more than a private reprimand.

But these statistics do not tell the whole story. 

Based on the data from 2006-2008, when the Commission on Judicial Conduct started reporting the actual number of complaints that were received, not just the number that were docketed, it can be confirmed that the Commission on Judicial Conduct actually received 1,277 complaints over this time period, but docketed only 398 of them.

What this means is that the Commission on Judicial Conduct dockets less than one of every three complaints that it receives!

Of the ten complaints that I have filed, only one of my complaints was not docketed.  That was my complaint against Essex Superior Court Judge Thomas Murtagh.

Although this particular complaint accuses the judge of failing to follow the law, of incompetence, of bias, of abusing his authority, and of denying to me my full opportunity to be heard; the Commission wrote:

We cannot docket this complaint because your allegations are based

upon the judge's written decisions.

The fact is that most cases conclude with some type of written decision. 

A decision which defies the law, which denies a litigant his full opportunity to be heard, and which confirms blatant judicial bias is certainly grounds for an appeal, but it is also grounds for a misconduct complaint against the judge who violated the judicial canons to arrive at such a decision.

The statistics are even more frightening when we limit the analysis to the Massachusetts probate family court system.

Of the 410 judges in the state, 51 of them work in probate family court.  Of the 644 complaints that have been docketed over the last five years, excluding the 660 complaints that were filed in 2004 against the state's Supreme Judicial Court for legalizing gay marriage, 264 complaints were docketed against family probate court judges.

What this means is that this state court subgroup, which consists of 12.4% of the state's judges, are the subject of 41.0% of the complaints docketed with the CJC. 

This also means that more complaints are docketed against probate family court judges each year than there are judges working as family court judges in the state. 

If ALL complaints received are conservatively considered and not just the ones "docketed", then each probate family court judge in the state is receiving on average three complaints per year.

And since I would guess that the majority of complaints received and not docketed originate in family court, where the decisions almost always defy the law, this average number of complaints could be as high as 6.8 per year per family court judge.

A look at how these complaints are "investigated" is even more outrageous.  The Commission on Judicial Conduct meets just once a month to dispose of the complaints that have been docketed.  This means that, on average, the Commission is dismissing approximately 10-12 complaints per meeting.

The subject judge is given the opportunity to respond to the complaint but the litigant who reported the judge does not have access to the judge's response so that he can communicate a rebuttal or provide additional information.

 

And although the CJC claims that one of its three staff members is assigned to each case to allegedly listen to the court tapes, interview witnesses, and review documents; I have yet to be contacted by a staff member prior to the dismissal of one of my complaints - dismissals which can be expected six months to a year from the time that the complaint is filed.

Success with misconduct complaints is even more unlikely against judges in federal court, where complaints are heard by the chief judge of the subject judge's district.

The fact that 99.88% of 7,462 complaints against federal court judges were found to be without merit to dismiss them, according to the judge's official statistics for 1997-2006, is a testament itself to how truly corrupt this system has become.  In those 10 years, the judges appointed only 7 special investigative committees and disciplined only 9 of their peers.

In the 219 years since the creation of the Federal Judiciary in 1789, of all the thousands of federal judges who have served, only 7 have been impeached and removed from the bench, which is, on average, 1 every 31 years.

Consequently, we have a system where absolute power has corrupted absolutely, where the foxes are guarding the henhouse, and where judges have placed themselves where no individual or class of people is entitled to be in our democratic society: Above the law.

On the web pages pertaining to my "corrupt judge list" is information that was contained in my appeals court documents and in eleven separate complaints to the Commission on Judicial Conduct and one complaint to the chief judge of the First Circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals, which dismissed every one of these complaints without taking action, concluding in every one of these cases that no judicial misconduct had occurred.

To put this response in perspective, I have attached some of the canons of judicial conduct that the Commission on Judicial Conduct had to disregard to dismiss these complaints, supplemented by some relevant commentary in italics.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:09)

CANON 1

A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary

A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.

Every judge who has reviewed my ten complaints to the CJC and/or reviewed the Massachusetts Appeals Court's fraudulent response to my appeal from family court and done nothing is guilty of violating this canon. 

The list includes the seven justices of the 2005 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Judges Margaret H. Marshall, Roderick L. Ireland, Francis X. Spina, Judith A. Cowin, Robert J. Cordy, Martha B. Sosman, and John M. Greaney); U.S. District Court Judge Douglas P. Woodlock; U.S. Court of Appeals Judges Sandra L. Lynch, Michael Boudin, and Norman H. Stahl; and the "Member-Judges" of the Commission on Judicial Conduct (Judges Margot Botsford, William W. Teahan, Jr., Susan D. Ricci, Stephen E. Neel, Paul F. Loconto, and Mary Ann Sahagian).

CANON 2

A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities

(A)A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct

himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

(B)A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to

influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige

of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey

or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position

to influence him.

CANON 3

A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently

(1)A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence

in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of

criticism.

(2)A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him.

(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors,

witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity,

and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court

officials, and others subject to his direction and control.

(4)A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a

proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. He should

not permit private interviews, arguments or communications designed to

influence his judicial action, where interests to be affected thereby are not

represented before him, except in cases where provision is made by law for

ex parte application.

Every judge who has defied the law to dismiss my cases before they

could succeed on their merits before a jury of my peers and/or denied

to me my right to present evidence favorable to my case is guilty of

violating this canon.

(5)A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.

Before recusing herself from my child custody case, Essex Family Court

Judge Manzi sat on my complaint for modification of my child custody

orders for a full year, four months beyond the deadline for the matter to be

heard and ruled on.

Essex Family Court Judge Cronin then sat on this same case for eleven

more months before issuing his law and fact-defying ruling, which was

two years from the time that the case was put on an eight-month track

assignment.

Essex Family Court Judge Digangi delayed the case involving the

banning of my book for nineteen months before I convinced the Mother to

drop the complaint.

And U.S. District Court Judge Woodlock sat on my federal court lawsuit

for two years to obstruct justice and prevent five judges from being found

guilty by an impartial jury of the crimes detailed in my complaint.

(6)A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities,

maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate

the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and

court officials.

(7)If a judge shall become aware of unprofessional conduct by a judge or a

lawyer

(a)he shall, in the instance of a judge, report his knowledge to the Chief Justice

of this court and of the court of which the judge in question is a member,

and

(b)in the instance of a lawyer, he shall initiate appropriate investigative or

disciplinary measures.

(8)A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.  A judge

shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct

manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice

based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual

orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court

officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so.

I have court-recorded comment after comment from Essex Family Court

Judges Mary McCauley Manzi and Peter C. Digangi, confirming beyond

any and all doubt that the two of them were biased against me as a male

and as a pro se litigant.

(9)A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality

might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances

where:

(a)he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

Essex Family Court Judge Manzi denied several motions for her

recusal from my case in defiance of the fact that she is the subject of

two complaints to the Commission on Judicial Conduct and a

defendant in a lawsuit that I filed in federal court.

Essex Family Court Judge Digangi denied my motion for recusal

from the case involving my book in defiance of the fact that he is

also the subject of two complaints to the Commission on Judicial

Conduct and a defendant in my federal court lawsuit.  Digangi is

also called "a dangerous combination of arrogance, ignorance, and

incompetence" in that same book.

U.S. District Court Judge Woodlock dismissed two cases that I had

in his court on the very same day for law-defying reasons rather

than recuse himself from these cases, as he was legally required to

do sua sponte when he became aware of the fact that I had reported

his negligence and obstruction of justice to the Chief Judge of the

First Circuit.

And Chief Judge Lynch of the First Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals

defied U.S Supreme Court case law and constitutional law to affirm

Woodlock's dismissal of my lawsuit against several judges rather

than recuse herself from this and a separate pending case as she

was legally required to do sua sponte at the moment in time when

she was given notice that I had reported her negligent failure to

hold one of her judges accountable (ie. Woodlock) in a Petition for

Review to the Judicial Council.