U.S. COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES SANDRA L. LYNCH, MICHAEL BOUDIN, NORMAN H. STAHL, JUAN R. TORRUELLA, KERMIT V. LIPEZ, JEFFREY R. HOWARD, AND O. ROGERIEE THOMPSON
The defendant wants to hide the truth because he's generally guilty. The defense attorney's job is to make sure the jury does not arrive at that truth. The judge also has a truth he wants to hide: He often hasn't been completely candid in describing the facts or the law.
Alan M. DershowitzA three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeal's First Circuit, consisting of Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch and Circuit Judges Michael Boudin and Norman H. Stahl, proved to me that the corruption that I had experienced in the state courts of Massachusetts extends to these three "Massachusetts-based" judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Their May 11, 2009 law-defying "affirmation" of U.S. District Court Judge Douglas P. Woodlock's law-defying dismissal of my lawsuit against several state court judges did not surprise me since I had been warned that the First Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals is notorious for affirming rulings that should be overturned.
What the First Circuit's ruling in this case "affirmed" is the law-defying claim that the Eleventh Amendment gives judges the absolute power to reject their oath, defy the law, misrepresent the facts, tamper with evidence, commit fraud, conspire among themselves to deny to litigants their constitutional rights, and condone all manner of evil simply because they proclaim themselves "immune".
For the record, the Eleventh Amendment gives judges no such "immunity". It gives states sovereign immunity from being sued by someone in another state or country. Somehow judges in this country have creatively interpreted this Amendment to allege that it places them above the law and accountable to no one.
In fact, the law that I cited to bring this lawsuit to federal court, Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, was specifically enacted to respond to judicial abuse (i.e. deprivation of rights under color of law).
Their affirmation of this case also defied previously established case law, more specifically, the case of Catz v. Chalker, which unambiguously stated that the domestic relations exceptions do NOT apply to cases brought to federal court for due process violations, and Marshall v. Marshall, which unambiguously stated that lower federal courts have been abusing the domestic relations exceptions to avoid hearing cases that are well within their jurisdiction.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), "oral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously agree that oral argument is unnecessary."
Judges Lynch, Boudin, and Stahl denied to me my right to oral argument, without "notice" to me prior to issuing its Judgment, and negligently failed to provide me with a "memorandum" or an "opinion" for affirming the district court's law-defying ruling, to conceal from the public the FACT that these three judges did not have a rebuttal to the legal arguments contained in my 55-page brief.
It should also be noted that this case was supposed to be reviewed de novo, which means without deference to the district court's reasoning. For these three judges to affirm the dismissal of my lawsuit with the line, "essentially for reasons given by the district court in its memorandum and order," is an outrage.
If, as alleged, the Court "reviewed the record in the case, including the briefs of the parties", to affirm the dismissal of ALL of my claims, then these three judges are also guilty of condoning fraud and extortion under "color of law".
It can hardly be disputed, except among judges intent on concealing the crimes committed by other judges, that a three-judge panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court did in fact commit fraud when it called the appeal of my child custody orders "egregiously frivolous with no basis in law or fact" to extort thousands of dollars from me.
The fact is that Chief Judge Lynch was legally obligated to recuse herself from this case, and all other cases involving me, sua sponte at the moment in time when she received notice that I had reported her negligent failure to hold one of her judges accountable in a Petition for Review to the Judicial Council.
An honorable judge would have recused herself immediately. The fact that Lynch assigned herself to not only this case, but a second case that I had filed, which she dismissed two months later, has me convinced that she did this to retaliate against me for criticizing her.
It was Lynch who dismissed my misconduct complaint against Woodlock.
In her November 10 2008-issued "Order", Lynch creatively "spun" the facts of my complaint to protect one of her "Moakley Courthouse colleagues", proving that she is as guilty as Woodlock of defying Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, specifically her duty to establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct.
Lynch's claim that "the reviewed record -- consisting of the misconduct complaint, the dockets of the cases at issue, and the relevant pleadings and court orders -- does not support the complainant's charges" is fraud and, consequently, a betrayal of public trust.
Lynch wrote in a page 4 footnote of her Order, "During the two-year pendency of the first case, the court held multiple hearings and issued numerous rulings before issuing a thorough memorandum and order of dismissal... The court's management of these proceedings was neither out of the ordinary nor remotely indicative of wrongdoing."
This misrepresentation of the facts is the reason why judges cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of holding other judges accountable.
Contrary to Lynch's summary of what occurred to exaggerate Woodlock's work on this case and downplay his negligence and obstruction of justice, there was a single hearing on this case in two years.
The only other "activity" on this case was the submission of some state court documents and the filing of a status report, which were ordered more than a year apart to keep the parties busy while Woodlock did nothing himself to move the case along.
Lynch may have been deceived by the fact that two other hearings are listed in the docket record.
What can be confirmed with the court transcripts is that these hearings were purely for show.
Woodlock prevented all discussion on the case against his "colleagues" by limiting his questions to my employment-related case, which he scheduled concurrently with my case against the judges.
Since the judge's legal counsel, Assistant Attorney General Lisa Fauth, was at these "sham" hearings for no other reason but to state her name, even she complained to me on both of these days about the court's requirement that she attend these hearings.
Lynch's claim that Woodlock "issued numerous rulings" also contradicts the facts of this case. The one and only "ruling" issued prior to Woodlock's dismissal of this case was his allowance of my motion for a ten-day extension of time to get in a memorandum - a ruling, which was particularly relevant to my judicial misconduct complaint.
I filed a motion for a ten-day extension of time on January 13, 2007 so that I would have until January 23, 2007 to get in a memorandum of law to respond to the comments expressed at the only true hearing held on this case (the January 4, 2007 scheduling conference). That memorandum of law was filed on January 16, 2007.
Woodlock did not respond to this motion until September 27, 2007, nine months after a ruling on this motion became moot, PROVING that Woodlock did not even read what he was allowing!
The docket record also confirms that motions for an expedited trial were filed on November 25, 2007 and June 25, 2008 without a response to these motions until Woodlock dismissed the case.
Lynch excused this negligence by stating that they were terminated in conjunction with the dismissal.
Woodlock dismissed the case on September 26, 2008, ten months after the first and three months after the second of these motions for an expedited trial were filed.
More importantly, the case was dismissed, along with my other case, seven weeks AFTER I filed my judicial misconduct complaint against Woodlock.
If there was any truth to Lynch's "rationalization" of Woodlock's misconduct, judges could ignore everything filed by litigants over the course of a case and defy their duty to dispense promptly the business of the court so long as they dismiss the case when they become aware of complaints that are lodged against them.
Lynch wrote, "After an extensive analysis of the guiding legal principles, the judge determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limited the court's jurisdiction to review the complainant's challenges, that the claims for monetary damages were barred by judicial immunity, and that the abstention doctrine prevented the court from awarding equitable relief."
If Woodlock had done an "extensive analysis", then he would have reviewed my rebuttal documents [particularly the cited cases of Catz v Chalker, 142 F.3d 279 (1998) and Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 164 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2006)], as part of that "extensive analysis", to KNOW that Rooker-Feldman, judicial immunity, and the abstention doctrine did NOT apply to this case.
To excuse Woodlock's failure to dispense promptly the business of the court, Lynch equated the twenty-two months that Woodlock sat on this case to a five-month delay in an unrelated case.
Lynch argued that since a five-month delay in deciding a temporary restraining order did not alone demonstrate misconduct in an unrelated judicial complaint, Woodlock's twenty-two month delay in ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss should also be excused as acceptable.
Such an absurd argument is proof that this particular judge is either wildly incompetent or willing to write almost anything to excuse the misconduct of judges, who happen to work in her courthouse.
To justify Woodlock's decision to retaliate against me in two separate cases rather than recuse himself, Lynch claimed that neither the judicial misconduct statute nor the governing rules require the recusal of a presiding judge upon the filing of a misconduct complaint against the judge.
The "rules" most certainly do require the recusal of a presiding judge any time a judge's ability to be impartial is reasonably questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
My Petition for Panel Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc to the full appellate court, which was filed to respond to the FACT that Lynch, Boudin, and Stahl defied numerous U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals decisions to affirm Woodlock's ruling, was denied by Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch, and Circuit Judges Juan R. Torruella, Michael Boudin, Norman H. Stahl, Kermit V. Lipez, and Jeffrey R. Howard.
Two months later, on July 6, 2009, Chief Judge Lynch and Circuit Judge Boudin again conspired to deny me justice by affirming Woodlock's law-defying dismissal of my case against Methuen and the MTA. The third judge of this three-judge panel was Circuit Judge Torruella.
Circuit Judge Jeffrey R. Howard was added as an accomplice when I file a motion to recuse Lynch and Boudin from this case based on what they had done to me in the case described above.
Howard did not only deny this motion, but added insult on top of injury by fraudulently calling my motion to recuse "frivolous".
Lynch, Boudin, and Torruella's ruling confirmed that there was nothing "frivolous" about my denied motion to recuse from this case Lynch and Boudin, who once again proved that they would defy the law and misrepresent the facts of the case to rule against me.
What their ruling "affirms" is Woodlock's law-defying claim that the First Amendment only applies to speech that is on "matters of public concern" and the fact-defying claim that the reporting of workplace harassment in a public school setting and corruption in a labor union's election process are not matters of public concern.
It is ironic that the ruling includes the line, "Plaintiff cannot replace the Supreme Court's understanding of the law with his own," since it was this three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals that was guilty of replacing the Supreme Court's understanding of the law with its own; of "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement"; and of redefining the First Amendment to deny to me my Seventh Amendment right to a trial before a jury of my peers.
Contrary to the panel's creative interpretation of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983), harassment of a teacher in a public school setting IS a matter of public concern and therefore NOT a matter that is "only" of personal interest. Furthermore, the First Amendment contains no such wording that limits its protection to speech on matters of public concern.
And contrary to the panel's false claim that I was not prohibited from reporting workplace harassment and corruption in my union's election process, I was suspended and ultimately fired for speech on these very topics.
The fact that the employer fraudulently called my reporting of workplace harassment and corruption in my union's election process as "discussions on family and litigation issues" to concoct a pretext reason to fire me does not make it true. Consequently, the pretext reason alleged by the employer to justify my dismissal is a matter of material fact for a jury to decide.
An honorable and competent court, taking all facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and reviewing the case in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, as required by law in ruling on a motion to dismiss, would have reached this conclusion. But this case was obviously not heard by such a court.
Listed below are links to the documents that six corrupt judges of the First Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals (Lynch, Boudin, Stahl, Torruella, Lipez, and Howard) had to ignore to rule against me.
Thompson v. Judges:Thompson v. Methuen/MTA:
CHIEF JUSTICE SANDRA L. LYNCH
A FISH ROTS FROM THE HEAD DOWN.
A SUMMARY OF THE MOST RECENT JUDICIAL CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST ME - PERPETRATED BY THREE CORRUPT JUDGES WHO ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO NO ONE
I will be more specific when I get the chance, but the judgment that I received today (October 5, 2011) is more evidence that the judges in Massachusetts, all the way up to the judges on the First Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals, are wildly corrupt from top to bottom.
My appeals court case against nine corrupt judges was dismissed today by three corrupt judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals (i.e. Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch, Judge Jeffrey R. Howard, and Judge O. Rogeriee Thompson) for reasons that remain a mystery since this three-judge panel did not even bother to hear oral arguments or write up a memorandum of law to justify its ruling.
The one-line explanation for the ruling stated, "Essentially for the reasons given in defendants' motion for summary disposition, we affirm the dismissal of all claims."
What makes this explanation a mystery is that the defendant-judges did not give any reasons that were supported by the law or that were not discredited by me in my Brief or in my Opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition.
In a nutshell, I proved with references to the law and case law that the defendant-judges in this case were NOT entitled to judicial immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; that the defendant-judges CAN be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights under color of law; and that my complaint was NOT barred by either the Rooker-Feldman or Younger Abstention doctrines. [Since this paragraph only summarizes the arguments that I discredited in my documents, I urge visitors to this site to click on the links above to review my appeal in much greater detail.]
What is worth mentioning before I conclude this summary is the FACT that the defendant-judges in this case did not even file a brief in this case. Instead, they filed a motion for summary disposition, which CANNOT be cited to dismiss an appeal.
The rule cited by the defendant-judges to bring this motion [i.e. First Circuit Rule 27(c)] unambiguously states:
A circuit judge may act alone on any motion, but may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding…
Federal Appellate Procedure Rule 28 required the defendant-judges to submit a law-complying "appellee brief" in response to my "appellant brief" if they hoped to be heard at oral argument. The requirements are very specific. Pursuant to Federal Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b): The appellee's brief must conform to the requirements of Rule 28(a)(1)-(9) and (11), which mandates:
The brief must contain, under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: (1) a corporate disclosure statement; (2) a table of contents, with page references; (3) a table of authorities, arranged alphabetically; (4) a jurisdictional statement; (5) a statement of the issues presented for review; (6) a statement of the case; (7) a summary of the argument; (9) the argument; and (11) a certificate of compliance.
The defendant-judges' motion for summary disposition did not, in any way, satisfy the requirements of the "appellee's brief". Moreover, pursuant to Federal Appellate Procedure Rule 28.1(f)(2):
The appellee's principal brief must be filed and served within 30 days after the appellant's principal brief is served.
Since my brief was filed and served electronically on June 27, 2011, the defendant-appellees had until July 27, 2011 to submit their brief. They never did file or serve a brief.
And lastly, an irony should be noted.
In state court, the defendant-judges fraudulently alleged that I made procedural errors; they denied my motions to correct the fraudulently alleged errors; and they ignored their duty to go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences of technical errors to deny to me my due process right to be heard.
In this case, the same defendant-judges asked the the U.S. Court of Appeals to ignore its procedural rules so that they could submit a more conveniently produced motion in lieu of a law-compliant brief - a request that I contend was made because the deadline for the submission of the appellee's brief had arrived and the defendant-judges were not prepared to submit one.
[Please note that the information shared in this text box is only a small fraction of what is contained in the links above, which is why I urge you to check them out.]
