JUDGE THOMAS MURTAGH, JUDGE FRANCES A. McINTYRE, AND JUDGE DAVID A. LOWY
Courts shall go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.
U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996)
Listed above are the three corrupt Essex superior court judges who have obstructed justice to prevent me from having a law-defying arbitration decision reviewed and overturned.  

The detail of this arbitration decision is contained on the web page dedicated to the corrupt arbitrator assigned to this case (Arbitrator Gary D. Altman).

Essex Superior Court Judge Thomas Murtagh dismissed my complaint for judicial review of the arbitration decision, not on the merits of my complaint, but because he falsely-claimed that the complaint was not served on the appropriate defendant.
 
For the record, I had appropriately listed the arbitrator as the defendant because it was the arbitrator who had defied the law and the facts of the case to affirm my wrongful dismissal and because it was the arbitrator who I had alleged was illegally influenced by the Massachusetts Teachers Association to rule against me - allegations which are to be taken as true when ruling on a motion to dismiss.

Murtagh's reason for dismissing the case not only contradicted the applicable laws and the "complaint for judicial review" template that I had obtained in Lawrence's Superior Court, but it also contradicted the advice that I had received from U.S. District Court Judge Douglas P. Woodlock, who denied my motion to add Murtagh to my federal court lawsuit with the claim that I had remedy to hold the arbitrator accountable in state court.

Murtagh also dismissed the case without a hearing, without a filed motion to dismiss, and without giving me the opportunity to correct the falsely-alleged defect before dismissing the case, in defiance of the fact that courts are to go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants from the consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.

The injustice was clear.  As stated elsewhere on this website, I was wrongfully dismissed from my tenured teaching position in Methuen for reporting an act of workplace harassment against me, which the arbitrator himself admitted was not grounds to fire me.

When I responded to Murtagh's dismissal of the case with a motion for reconsideration to challenge his claim that "a complaint alleging disagreement, fraud, etc. in connection with an arbitration proceeding must be pursued in a manner different than in suing the arbitrator directly," Murtagh added the claim that service of process was insufficient.

Since a motion to dismiss was not filed by the arbitrator, since a defense of insufficiency of process is "waived" if not asserted in a timely motion or responsive pleading, since I had documented proof that the summons and complaint were served on the arbitrator, who admitted to receiving the complaint in an affidavit, and since the failure of the arbitrator to respond to the complaint in a timely manner should have resulted in an allowance of my motion for a default judgment; I filed a motion to quash the process and allow issuance and service of an amended complaint pursuant to Massachusetts General Law, Chapter 223, Section 84.

Murtagh never did respond to this motion and eventually recused himself from the case when I added him to my federal court lawsuit.

The case was transferred to Judge Maureen B. Hogan, who postponed a scheduled hearing on the matter from October 9, 2008 to October 21, 2008, when it was heard, not by her, but by Essex Superior Court Judge Francis A. McIntyre, who denied my motion to quash the process and allow issuance and service of an amended complaint on November 14, 2008 without responding to any of the legitimate reasons expressed for why this motion should be allowed. 

Since the only reason to deny this motion is one that reeks of malice, it is my contention that McIntyre denied it to add to my costs and retaliate against me for suing several state court judges, including her Essex Superior Court colleague (Judge Murtagh).

Forced to pay another $365 in filing fees and constable fees to re-file and serve an amended complaint for judicial review, the case was assigned to Judge Paul Chernoff and transferred at a later time to Judge Kathe M. Tuttman.

This transfer represented the third straight time that one of my Essex Superior Court cases was transferred from the judge randomly assigned to the case at the time that it was filed to a new judge. 

In each of these three cases, the transfer to a new judge was manipulated by continuing the case into the future, and in each of the two previous cases, the case was transferred to a judge who proved to be corrupt.

This second complaint for judicial review was filed on November 25, 2008 and not scheduled for hearing until March 19, 2009 to rule on Methuen's motion to dismiss the complaint. This hearing was postponed a second time to April 30, 2009. 

Both parties showed up for this hearing to be told that the judge was unavailable and that the hearing would need to be rescheduled again.

Since there was more than enough information contained in my complaint and response to the defendant's motion to dismiss to deny this motion, I agreed to have the motion decided on the written pleadings.

Rather than rule on the motion on the written pleadings, Tuttman rescheduled another hearing four more months into the future to August 27, 2009. 

After communicating my objection to this date, Tuttman moved the hearing up to July 8, 2009, when it was heard, not by Tuttman, but by Essex Superior Court Judge David A. Lowy.

At the July 8, 2009 hearing, which was moved from Lawrence to Salem on the day of the hearing, it became clear that Lowy was "reaching" for a reason to dismiss the case when he put words in opposing counsel's mouth to emphasize that their motion to dismiss was being brought pursuant to "subject matter jurisdiction".

For the record, opposing counsel's motion to dismiss had nothing at all to do with subject matter jurisdiction. 

Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter.  Subject matter jurisdiction is not lost because of an alleged procedural error made by a litigant.

It can hardly be disputed, except among judges and court personnel who have conspired among themselves to deny me justice, that my complaint for judicial review was appropriately filed in superior court, where subject matter jurisdiction does exist.

M.G.L. c. 71, §42, which was the law that gave the American Arbitration Association the authority to rule on my dismissal, contains the condition that "the arbitral decision shall be subject to judicial review as provided in chapter one hundred and fifty C.

And M.G.L. c. 150C, §11(a) unambiguously states:

Upon application of a party, the superior court shall vacate an award if:

(1)the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2)there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, or corruption in
any of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3)the arbitrators exceeded their powers or rendered an award requiring a person to
commit an act or engage in conduct prohibited by state or federal law;
(4)the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon a sufficient cause being shown
therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section five as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party.

Every one of these provisions applied to my complaint.

So that he could obstruct justice and deny to me my due process right to be heard, Judge Lowy misrepresented the facts with the claim that this case is about "subject matter jurisdiction" so that he could cite law and case law that does NOT apply to this case to dismiss it.

By falsely alleging that superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear my complaint for judicial review, which would be a "substantive issue" to dismiss the case if it were true, it allowed Judge Lowy to ignore case law that applies to pro se litigants, specifically the fact that "courts shall go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result."  U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).

The injustice that would otherwise result was described in detail in my complaint for judicial review and in the "chalk" attached to my Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit G).

This was not a case of a pro se litigant incompetently filing a superior court case in bankruptcy court or family court, which would then qualify as "a lack of subject matter jurisdiction", it was about a very competent litigant expeditiously doing everything that a reasonable litigant OR lawyer would have done with the information provided to him by lawyers and superior court personnel to have his case heard.

The only individuals guilty of incompetence in this case are the judges, who creatively interpreted the law in a light least favorable to me to retaliate against me for my efforts to expose court corruption and hold a growing list of corrupt judges accountable, AND Essex superior court personnel, who provided me with misinformation.

The reason alleged by opposing counsel to dismiss the case (that my complaint for judicial review should be dismissed as untimely because of the law-defying dismissal of my original complaint followed by the law-defying denial of my motion to amend that complaint) is the very definition of a "technicality".

As previously stated and apparently disregarded by the court to dismiss this case, I filed my original complaint for judicial review on May 13, 2008, well within the 30 day time period to appeal the arbitrator's April 18, 2008 decision. 

With the exception of replacing M.G.L. c. 30A with M.G.L. c. 150C and modifying the claims for relief to comply with M.G.L. c. 150C; I followed the "complaint for judicial review" template that I had received from an Essex Superior Court clerk to the letter. 

A task required to follow the template meant listing the "decision-maker" as the defendant.  Since it is the arbitrator's name on the "Decision and Award", I logically assumed that the arbitrator should be listed as the defendant and then served him with the summons and complaint via the American Arbitration Association per their instructions.

The crimes committed by Judges Thomas Murtagh and Francis A. McIntyre, which are described above, resulted in the dismissal of my original complaint.

I did not wait one year, or five months as alleged by the defendants, but waited just two weeks, after seeking advice from a lawyer, before commencing a new action for the same cause.

And contrary to the court's agenda-driven interpretation of the law and case law to obstruct justice, M.G.L. c.260, §32 DOES apply to this case.

M.G.L. c.260, §32 unambiguously states:

If an action duly commenced within the time limited in this chapter is dismissed for... any matter of form... the plaintiff or any person claiming under him may commence a new action for the same cause within one year after the dismissal or other determination of the original action.

The defendant and Judge Lowy cited "Maltz v. Smith Barney, Inc., 427 Mass 560, 562 (1998) to claim that chapter 260 only applies to common law actions of contract or tort.
 
Aside from the fact that my original complaint for judicial review was filed as a tort to recover back pay and arbitration costs, and therefore, applies to this case law, chapter 260 itself contains no such limiting language.  It falls under the general category of "personal actions".

My reference to M.G.L. c. 260, § 32 was not to revive the time needed to respond to the arbitrator's decision and award, which is what was ruled on in Maltz v. Smith Barney, Inc.  It was cited to revive my timely-filed complaint for judicial review, which was dismissed on a matter of form.

Although this is not yet an appeal to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, it is, in substance, an appeal of a law-defying decision. 

Massachusetts Appeals Court Rule 10(c) states, in relevant part that, "a court may dismiss an appeal only upon a finding of "inexcusable neglect" and the court shall enlarge the appellant's time for taking the required action."

In the case of Patten v. Mayo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 660 (1987), the court ordered a case to go forward, citing as one reason the trial judge's failure to make an explicit finding of "inexcusable neglect" regarding the appellant's misunderstanding of procedure.

The dismissal of a case is also supposed to be a DRASTIC remedy that is employed only sparingly. See Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveway Co., 173 F.3d at 918 (4th Cir. 1999).

Since I am pro se, the Court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss.  Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be construed liberally and are to be held to less stringent standards than submissions by lawyers. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 (1980).

With that being said, I have yet to survive a motion to dismiss in Essex Superior Court or U.S. District Court for reasons that have had nothing at all to do with the merits of these cases OR my competence at representing myself in court.

Taken separately, the crimes committed against me could be credited to judicial incompetence, but taken cumulatively and it can hardly be disputed that there is more than enough circumstantial evidence to conclude that there has been a conspired effort among several state and federal court judges to deny me justice. 

Judge Lowy writes in his Memorandum of Decision and Order that I asked for leniency as a pro se litigant, which is the rhetoric used by judges all the time to imply that pro se litigants are seeking "favored" treatment in court. 

I asked for leniency because the law and case law mandate that pro se litigants receive some leniency.
 
What occurs in the twisted world of the Massachusetts court system is exactly the opposite, where judges are eager to cite procedural errors to harass pro se litigants, while, at the same time, look the other way when those same rules are violated by lawyers.

If Essex Superior Court enforced its procedural rules on lawyers, then I would have won this case thirteen months earlier with a default judgment, pursuant to Mass. Civil Procedure Rule 55(a).

As stated on the Summons served upon lawyer/arbitrator Gary D. Altman, if the defendant fails to serve an answer to the complaint within 20 days after service of the summons, judgment by default will be taken against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint.  The defendant is legally required to respond regardless of what he thinks about the merits of the case.

I have discovered that the only individuals held to a standard pertaining to procedure are pro se litigants. 

I can also prove beyond any and all doubt that I have been more compliant with the procedural rules than EVERY lawyer who I have EVER been up against in court.  The only difference is that judges have, without exception, looked the other way to ignore lawyer incompetence.

If you are a lawyer in the state of Massachusetts up against a pro se litigant:

(1)You can ignore subpoenas and discovery requests;
(2)You can ignore the deadlines for the filing of documents;
(3)You can withdraw from cases that have been scheduled for trial without showing up to
court;
(4)You can open up new cases without serving a summons or complaint on the other
party;
(5)You can show up to trial an hour late.
(6)You can have cases dismissed on summary judgment without filing a motion for this
action;
(7)You are allowed to commit perjury and suborning perjury;
(8)And you do not need first hand witnesses or admissible evidence to prove your case.

The bottom line is that an honorable court would have concluded that there was nothing about my efforts to have the arbitration decision reviewed that could be attributed to "inexcusable neglect".

Consequently, the dismissal of this case was a miscarriage of justice and confirms that Judge David Lowy is as corrupt and/or incompetent as every other judge listed on this website.

That fact has been further confirmed with his "procedural ruling" on my motion for relief of his law-defying dismissal of the case.

I originally filed a motion for relief of Lowy's dismissal of the case on July 17, 2009 and re-filed it on July 30, 2009, with opposing counsel's opposition, so that the filing would comply with Superior Court Rule 9A, which requires that motions and oppositions to those motions be filed together as a "package".

Apparently, Lowy had not yet reviewed the "re-filed" motion when he responded to my original July 17, 2009 motion on August 3, 2009 with a notice that read:

Court received Plaintiff's memorandum in support of his motion for relief from Judge Lowy's decision and order...  Defendant has until September 10, 2009 to respond.

Although the "accommodation" that Lowy is providing to opposing counsel does not apply, due to the fact that the Defendant has already responded to my motion, it is "telling" still the same.

Just three weeks after dismissing my complaint for judicial review with the claim that my complaint was not timely served, Lowy has decided to give opposing counsel two months to respond to a motion that, by law, should be filed within 20 days.

What this "tells" me is that the rules are different for lawyers and pro se litigants in Lowy's courtroom. 

As expected, Lowy denied my motion for relief from his dismissal of the case, forcing me to appeal the case to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, where it currently sits four months from the date that I filed my brief in this case.  

MURTAGH
LOWY
McINTYRE