March 26, 2010
Massachusetts Appeals Court
Appeals Court Clerk's Office
John Adams Courthouse
Suite 1200
One Pemberton Square
Boston, MA 02108
Re:
Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to Mass R.A.P. Rule 27


Kevin Thompson v. Valley Patriot, Inc. et al
To Judge Joseph A. Grasso, Jr. (The Senior Justice of the Three-Judge Panel that Ruled on my Appeal):
It never ceases to shock and disgust me that no matter how many facts must be ignored (or creatively interpreted) to rule against me and no matter how many laws and case law must be defied to rule against me, the judges in the Massachusetts court system will do just that to prevent my cases from succeeding on their merits before a constitutionally-prescribed jury of my peers.
There are only two possible explanations for this court's fact and law-defying response to my appeal - either these three judges are corrupt or they are incompetent.
Since no one could possible be as incompetent as this ruling would prove these judges to be, it is my contention that these three judges have conspired among themselves to deny me justice as a vocal critic of the Massachusetts court system and as the plaintiff in a lawsuit filed against three of their appeals court colleagues (i.e. Justices Gelinas, Cypher, and Trainor).
Since this petition is also being heard by the same three-judge panel that denied to me my opportunity to be heard via oral argument, that ignored the FACT that neither a motion for summary judgment nor a motion to dismiss was before the court to dismiss this case, and that creatively interpreted several statements from the article that were for a jury (not a judge) to decide and that would be interpreted as libelous before such a jury; it does not take a genius to know what their response will be to this petition, which is being filed to further document the deprivation of rights under color of law committed against me by this court for my appeal of this case to federal court as a Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.
What this court's ruling also proves is that judges in the state of Massachusetts are "more equal" than the rest of us since this case FAR EXCEEDS the merits of a libel case brought by Superior Court Judge Ernest B. Murphy, who not only survived a motion to dismiss to have his case heard before a jury, but who also survived an appeal of that ruling.
As it pertains to this court's claim that opinion is never actionable, in defiance of the case law contained in my brief and reply brief to confirm otherwise, it should be noted that Judge Murphy won his defamation case against the Boston Herald on statements which were not only opinion, but which were supported by sources that were superior to the sources provided by Paula Porten in this case to substantiate her claims.
In fact, most of the "sources" alleged by Porten in her affidavit, signed under the pains and penalties of perjury, did not even exist at the time that she wrote the article, which means that this court allowed her to get away with fraud on the court.
This failure of the court to enforce the laws regarding perjury is not surprising since I have yet to be before a judge in this state that has enforced ANY laws or procedural rules when violated by litigants and lawyers who have opposed me in court.
It is worth noting that one of the judges on this panel, Judge Mitchell J. Sikora, alleged libel himself through the same attorney, Howard M. Cooper, who represented Murphy in his libel lawsuit against the Boston Herald.
Apparently, it is only judges in this state who can be "damaged" by slanderous statements about them since Judge Sikora alleged "damage" against the same Boston Herald for their coverage and "opinion" about his handling of a case involving a motorist who struck and killed a Medfield police officer in 2000.
Since the only individuals guilty of defying the law in the lower court were opposing counsel and Judge Merita A. Hopkins, I further contend that this court's claim that I "argued at the outset" that I am "entitled" to be held to less stringent standards was nothing more than "rhetoric" communicated to imply that I sought some kind of "favored treatment", which is exactly what the Valley Patriot received from this court to escape accountability for their actions.
I simply referenced the FACT that "pro se" case law exists which states, among other things, that:
The court is under a duty to examine the [pro se] complaint to determine if the allegations provide
for relief on any possible theory. If there is any possible theory that would entitle the Plaintiff to relief, even one that the Plaintiff has not thought of, the court cannot dismiss the case." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974).
The Memorandum and Order contains nothing of truth OR accuracy that overcomes this high bar for the "dismissal" of a case, which is described in another case as "a drastic remedy that is employed only sparingly." Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveway Co., 173 F.3d at 918 (4th Cir. 1999).
With that being said and with a reference to being described as "a knowledgeable and experienced self-represented litigant" by this court, I have NEVER survived a motion to dismiss in state or federal court for reasons that have had nothing at all to do with the merits of these cases or my competence at representing myself in court.
The "creative" interpretations of the statements contained in the libelous article are proof that this three-judge panel went out of its way to interpret the statements in a light most favorable to the moving party, in defiance of the case law contained in my brief, which states:
Summary judgment is appropriate only "where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Gray v. Giroux, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 436, 438 (2000). See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).
In this case, the moving party did not "move" for summary judgment or for dismissal with the required motion and did not state a single fact or argument to justify such a due process defying response from the lower court OR from this court. Instead, this court made up its own reason to affirm the dismissal of this case.
It is self-evident that this court only referenced case law that it believed it could "spin" to support its ruling, while ignoring all law and case law that directly contradicted its agenda-driven interpretations.
Among the law and case law contained in my brief and ignored by this court to fabricate a bogus reason to rule against me included the following:
(1)
To determine whether or not a statement is an opinion, a court "must 'examine the statement

in its totality and in the context in which it was uttered or published. The court must

consider all the words used... [and] must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person

publishing the statement.' Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances

surrounding the statement." Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 415 Mass. 258, 263 (1993),

quoting Fleming v. Benzaquin, 390 Mass. 175, 180-81 (1983).
(2)
Many jurisdictions have eliminated the distinction between fact and opinion, and instead

hold that any statement that suggests a factual basis can support a cause of action for

defamation. The fact that a statement is opinion does not automatically shield it from a

defamation claim. "Expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective

fact." Milkovich v. Lourain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).
(3)
Thus, a cause of action for defamation may still be sustained when an opinion "implies the

allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't

Employees, Inc. v. Central Broad. Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 227-28 (1979).
(4)
The alleged defamatory statements need not be an explicit assertion. "An insinuation may be

as actionable as a direct statement." Mabardi v. Boston-Herald Traveler Corp., 347 Mass.

411, 413 (1964).
(5)
"The summary judgment remains particularly rigorous when the disputed issue turns on a

question of motive or intent." Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir.

1988).
(6)
"The existence of defamatory innuendo is a question of fact for a jury to consider." Reilly v.

Associated Press, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 774 (2003).
Not even the defendants in this case proposed such an absurd claim as to allege that Paula Porten was not slandering me directly with the accusation that:
The book contains slanderous statements attributed to Judge Manzi, Judge Digangi, the 
court clerks, the mother, and the mother's attorney.
To allege that this statement was about "Judge Manzi, Judge Digangi, the court clerks, the mother, and the mother's attorney" making slanderous statements of their own (?!), which does not, in any way, support an article titled, "Father's Priorities Are Out of Wack," required this three-judge panel to feign ignorance about a poorly worded statement by Paula Porten and then take that statement completely out of context.
If this court's "interpretation" of the statement was what Porten intended in her article, then why did she not propose such an explanation in her response to my lawsuit OR in her reply brief?
She did not propose such an explanation because it would be an insult to the intelligence of anyone with enough reasoning ability to know from reading the full article and the affidavit submitted by Porten herself that it was written by a family court attorney under a fake name to maliciously and anonymously slander and discredit me as the author of a book on family court corruption.
Equally absurd was this court's claim that I, as a "lay person", cannot be slandered by the baseless statement:
Mr. Thompson seems to not understand the rules again and think that such details are minor.
For the record, I am the author of a book, in which I purport to be an expert on the law as it is not applied in family court. This is a book that would not have been written if judges in the Massachusetts court system adhered to the law as it is written.
Therefore, I am not a "lay person" as creatively alleged by this court to excuse a comment that was clearly communicated by a family court attorney to maliciously discredit me and my book.
As it pertains to the libelous claim that "the book contains sensitive and privileged information about [my] son," which this court claims is not defamatory because a judge claimed that impoundment was necessary to protect the privacy interests of my son, it should be noted that this ruling was overturned by a single justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, who possessed enough integrity and reasoning ability to conclude that a judge cannot make baseless comments about a book that she has never seen (due to the FACT that it was not submitted into evidence).
For the record, I have taken my own survey of several "reasonable" people and not ONE has agreed with this court's interpretation of the article, which, I repeat, is for a jury to interpret.
The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases was enacted to eliminate the "tyranny" of giving a single judge the power to decide an individual's case. That tyranny is alive and well in the Massachusetts court system, where judges have, without exceptions, obstructed justice for me by dismissing my cases ILLEGALLY before these cases could succeed on their merits before a jury of my peers.
It can hardly be disputed, except among judges who have conspired among themselves to deny me justice, that:
(1)
The Valley Patriot's fraudulent claim that my book "contained slanderous statements

attributed to Judge Manzi, Judge Digangi, the court clerks, the mother's lawyer, and the

mother" is both libelous and an issue of material fact for a jury to decide.
(2)
The Valley Patriot's fraudulent claim that my book contains "sensitive and privileged

information about [my] son" is both libelous and an issue of material fact for a jury to

decide.
(3)
The Valley Patriot's baseless claims that I am a disgruntled dad, constantly angry,

disrespectful of the court's rules, and incompetent at representing myself in court, alleged by

someone who has never met me either in or outside of a courtroom, are libelous and issues

of material fact for a jury to decide.
As cited in my brief, "a statement is defamatory if it may reasonably be read as discrediting [the plaintiff] in the minds of any reasonable class of the community." Disend v. Meadowbrook Sch., 604 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Mass.App.Ct. 1992).
According to the Time-Picayune, Fifth Circuit Louisiana Judge Edward Dufresne directed court staffer Jerrold Peterson to automatically deny any appeal that was not filed by an attorney. This crime was only exposed after the staffer committed suicide, blaming guilt for the 2,500 appeals he denied over thirteen years.
Based on the judicial crimes that I have witnessed over the last seven years, I contend that the Massachusetts court system from the lower courts all the way up to the "Massachusetts-based" First Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals is not any less corrupt.
As certain as I am that my case against the Valley Patriot would succeed on its merits before a jury of my peers is as certain as I was that this court would defy the law and the facts of this case to rule against me.
The dismissal of this case was not affirmed because it was meritless. It was affirmed because it would succeed before an honorable and impartial jury. Consequently, it is an egregious betrayal of public trust and the laws of the land that these three judges have sworn to uphold.
The perversion of justice that I have witnessed over the last seven years has me convinced that I have a better chance of winning the lottery than I do of finding an honorable judge in this state with the integrity to do the right thing and allow me my due process right to be heard before a jury of my peers.